How North Korean Artillery Supplies Saved Russia’s War Effort: 6 Million Rounds Left Ukraine Tremendously Outgunned

<p >Recent estimates of the scale of North Korean shipments of artillery rounds to the Russian Armed Forces have shed new light on the extent of Pyongyang’s importance as an arms supplier to its neighbour at a time of ongoing conflict with Ukraine and its <a href=" target="_blank">Western supporters</a>. Reports of North Korean munitions shipments to Russia first emerged in mid-2022, at a time when it was becoming increasingly clear that artillery would<a href=" target="_blank"> play a central role </a>in deciding the outcome of the ongoing war effort. Countries across the Western world accordingly moved to seriously deplete their own artillery stockpiles, in some cases<a href=" target="_blank"> emptying them entirely</a>, while scouring black markets for further supplies. North Korea retains by far the world’s largest peacetime artillery force, several times the size of pre-war Russia’s, with its productive capacities and stockpiles accordingly being particularly valuable for the ongoing war. The latest estimates indicate that the country has sent close to 6 million 152mm and 122mm artillery rounds to Russia in close to 20,000 shipping containers. </p><p ><img src=" title="Russian Army 2S5 Giatsint Self Propelled 152mm Howitzer"></p><p >Approximately 75 percent of North Korean artillery rounds shipped to Russia have been 152mm calibre, with 85 percent of containers carrying these larger rounds although less rounds are accommodated per container. While NATO and Chinese howitzers have a 155mm calibre, Russia and North Korea have both inherited the 152mm calibre first developed in the Soviet Union. The large majority of Ukrainian artillery are also 152mm systems, although it has received growing quantities of Western 155mm howitzers and rounds. North Korea notably also deploys the world’s only 170mm howitzers, which fuelled some early speculation that Russia could seek to acquire these larger guns or that they could be deployed to Russia alongside <a href=" target="_blank">North Korean forces </a>in the country. 152mm systems in Russian service capable of using munitions delivered by North Korea include the Soviet 2A36 Giatsint-B and the newer Soviet 2A65 Msta-B towed systems, as well as the Soviet 2S3 Akatsiya, 2S5 Giatsint-S, and 2S19 Msta-S mobile artillery systems. The Russian Army also fields a very small number of 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV and 2S43 Malva systems developed after the disintegration of the USSR. </p><p ><img src=" title="Korean People`s Army Barrage From 170mm Guns"></p><p >North Korea’s wholly unrivalled capability to supply artillery is likely to have been a major game changer for Russia’s ability to wage war in the Ukrainian theatre, providing a distinct advantage over the Ukrainian Army’s much more limited supplies from the West. Although major efforts to surge production of artillery rounds in Russia has resulted in a productive capacity of around 250,000 rounds per month in 2024, North Korean supplies to the Russian Army have been equivalent to two years of domestic production at this much expanded rate. The fact that Korean rounds were available long before Russia was able to expand its production capacity has only made this more significant. </p><p >While Russian artillery capabilities have grown tremendously since early 2022, very limited munitions supplies have been a primary factor diminishing Ukrainian artillery capabilities. By late 2023 Ukrainian artillery units had already been<a href=" > forced to reduce</a> ammunition expenditure by 80-90 percent to just 10-20 rounds per day. The <a href=" >diversion</a> of American munitions to Israel from early October that year, many of which had previously been marked for dispatch to Ukraine, only exacerbated the situation, with the U.S. Military <a href=" >itself facing</a> increasingly severe shortages in several important categories as a result of donations to Kiev. The artillery advantage Russia has enjoyed over Ukraine as a result of the discrepancy in the delivery capacities of their suppliers has been a central factor in its favour. </p>