<p >Iranian and Iranian affiliated sources have from late October widely reported that the country had reached an agreement with Russia for the license production of Su-35 fighter aircraft, which would allow for the manufacture of between 48 and 72 aircraft. The reports follow the Iranian Air Force’s <a href=" target="_blank">receipt of its first batch</a> of Russian combat jets since the 1990s, namely Yak-130 fighter-trainers, on September 1 2023, and follow multiple statements from Iranian sources indicating that the country was set to acquire Su-35s. Personnel from Iran reportedly&nbsp;<a href=" >began training</a>&nbsp;for Su-35 operations in Russia in 2022, and in February the following year Iranian official sources in February published footage of a new very heavily<a href=" >&nbsp;fortified airbase named Eagle 44</a>&nbsp;intended host the first Su-35s delivered. On November 28, 2023, Iranian Deputy Defence Minister Mehdi Farahi <a href=" >confirmed</a> that the country had finalised plans to receive&nbsp;Su-35s alongside Russian <a href=" >Mi-28 attack helicopters</a>,&nbsp;the latter which were expected to serve in the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Selling Su-35s to Iran provides Russia with a means to offset some of the costs of&nbsp;<a href=" >importing </a>large numbers of Iranian drones, while also providing a market for its fighters that is highly resilient to <a href=" target="_blank">threats of Western sanctions</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p ><img src=" title="Su-35 and F-4 Mockups at Eagle 44 Airbase"></p><p >The Su-35’s suitability to meet Iran’s immediate needs has been improved by intensive combat testing in the Ukrainian theatre, where the fighters&nbsp;have played a leading role in air to air operations and&nbsp;gained multiple kills, with one of their&nbsp;<a href=" >most notable successes&nbsp;</a>coming in the war’s initial days when he aircraft reportedly&nbsp;<a href=" >shot down four&nbsp;</a>of the Ukrainian Air Force Su-27s near the city of Zhytomir. Multiple&nbsp;<a href=" >further kills</a>&nbsp;have included more Su-27s, as well as MiG-29s,<a href=" >&nbsp;Su-24M</a>&nbsp;strike fighters, Su-25 ground attack jets, Mi-8 helicopters, and a wide range of drone classes, while the aircraft have also been used for strike and air defence suppression roles and taken far fewer losses than Russia’s Su-30 and Su-34 fighters.</p><p >With reports of Iranian personnel training to operate Su-35s having emerged over two years ago, and deliveries having yet to be made, the status of the deal remains highly uncertain today. Some reports have indicated that Iran may have cancelled plans to acquire Su-35s, leading Russia to intensify efforts to market its already built export configured fighters to <a href=" clients</a>. Iran’s seeking of a license production agreement would do much to explain the contradictions between reports that training personnel to operate the aircraft and is building new fortified facilities to accommodate them, but has not received any for over two years despite continued threats of Western or Israeli air attacks.&nbsp;</p><p ><img src=" title="Su-35 Fires R-37M Long Range Air to Air Missile"></p><p >The possibility of license production of the Su-35 in Iran nevertheless remains in question for a number of reasons. The clearest is the nature of the sources reporting such a deal, with none having been among the more reliable of official Iranian affiliated sources, in contrast to prior reports on Su-35 acquisitions. The second is that reports consistently stated that Iran would license produce both the Su-35 and the Su-30, which appears particularly unlikely due to the very different designs and limited commonality between the two aircraft that are built in entirely different factories. Setting up two separate facilities for license production of separate aircraft with similar capabilities would deny Iran the economies of scale which a small licensed production run already sorely lacks, driving up costs unnecessarily. A third major factor is that license production would be far more costly for Iran that importing the fighters from Russia, and would take considerably longer. Despite license production on a very large scale of over 200 aircraft, India’s Su-30 fighters cost <a href=" target="_blank">close to twice as much </a>as their Russian built counterparts, with Iranian-built Su-35s expected to cost well over twice as much to produce as those built in Russia if just 48-72 are produced.&nbsp;</p><p ><img src=" title="Su-35 Production at the Komsomolsk on Amur Aircraft Plant"></p><p >While Iranian license production of the Su-35 appears unlikely, it remains highly possible that Iran would be seeking to indigenise the production of key parts of the fighter, in particular many of the most frequently needed spare parts, to reduce its reliance on Russian maintenance support. This would hardly be unprecedented, and would mirror the strong emphasis on indigenisation seen following Iran’s acquisitions of American F-4, F-5 and F-14 fighters and Soviet Su-22, Su-24 and MiG-29 fighters. Such efforts by Iran have been bolstered considerably by advances in 3d printing technologies. Although Russia has offered India license production deals for over 100 Su-35 fighters, accompanied by technology transfers, the much smaller scale of Iran’s aviation industry and its smaller scale of expected acquisitions leaves the viability of such a deal in question.&nbsp;The fact that Iran requires Su-35s with some urgency, and that the fighter class’ avionics are increasingly out of date relative to those of the newer Su-57 and to new American and Chinese aircraft, also limits the likely attraction of a more protracted deal for license production.&nbsp;</p>