How Iran Built Up a Russian Air Defence Network: What Are Its Strengths and Limitations Today?

<p >The Iranian Armed Forces began to make significant investments in ground based air defence systems in the 1980s, beginning in the Iran-Iraq War with acquisitions of a network of Chinese systems built around the HQ-2 – a derivative of the Soviet S-75 which provided the country with advanced high altitude targeting capabilities. Following rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1989, Iran would in the 1990s acquire second hand Soviet-built <a href=" target="_blank">S-200D long range air defence systems</a> with unrivalled 300 kilometre targeting ranges, which for the first time provided significant coverage across its airspace. The powerful radar coverage of the systems also more than compensated for serious losses to radar installations from Iraqi strikes during the Iran-Iraq War. Iranian air defences nevertheless remained well behind the cutting edge, as Russia from the early-mid 1990s began to export its new S-300PM family of systems that combined diverse arrays of complementary missile classes with long range targeting capabilities and high mobility in an unprecedented way. </p><p ><img src=" title="Iranian Surface to Air Missile From S-200D System " ></p><p >With the large majority of new S-300PM series systems produced in Russia being exported to Russia in the 1990s, Chinese demand for the systems declined significantly in the 2000s as the country began to operationalise increasingly advanced variants of its <a href=" target="_blank">HQ-9 system</a>, which quickly came to boast advantages over its Russian counterparts particularly in terms of electronics. As the United States and its Western allies continued in the 2000s to consider options for attacks on Iran in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, Iran would in 2007 place its first order for high mobility long range Russian air defence systems – namely the S-300PMU-1 system. These orders were welcome to help compensate for the sharp decline in Chinese demand. The S-300PMu-1 was nevertheless significantly less capable than the S-300PMU-2 sold to China the previous decade, or the <a href=" target="_blank" >new S-400</a> operationalised in Russia itself, but still represented a revolutionary improvement to Iran’s network. In 2010, however, the new administration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stopped the sale of S-300s before any deliveries had been made, resulting in a significant diplomatic fallout between the two countries. Although Iran had acquired Russian Tor-M1 short ranged systems with advanced anti cruise missile systems in the early 2000s, it was otherwise unable to make significant acquisitions. </p><p ><img src=" title="Iranian Air Force Soviet Supplied MiG-29s"></p><p >While the Soviet Union had proven to be a reliable supplier to Iran, post-Soviet Russia would prove <a href=" target="_blank">far more susceptible </a>to Western pressure, and cancelled multiple arms deals in the 1990s including license production of T-72 tanks, while also<a href=" target="_blank"> ceasing to re-equip</a> the Iranian Air Force with MiG-29 and Su-24M fighters as the USSR had been doing. Moscow took these steps despite having significant surpluses of the systems it was supplying to Iran, and at a time when its defence sector was desperately in need of revenues, which indicated the tremendous degree of influence which the Western world retained over the country. This was key to ensuring that Western Bloc states and Israel would retain options to attack Iranian targets with relatively little resistance. Russia notably lifted its restriction on selling S-300 systems in 2015 following the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement, a year after Moscow’s relations with the West declined over the Ukrainian conflict, with Russia supplying Iran with more capable S-300PMU-2 systems from April-October 2016. These systems had originally been built to meet orders from Syria, before Moscow under Western pressure <a href=" target="_blank">pulled out of the deal </a>and refused to supply Damascus with modern long range air defence systems. Little is know about the customisation of the systems Iran did receive, but they are known to use 96L6E target-acquisition radars, 30N6E2 target-engagement radars and 64N6E2 battle management radars. </p><p ><img src=" title="Israeli F-35I With Live GBU-31/B Bombs"></p><p >Alongside S-300s, it was revealed by Russian sources in 2020 that Iran had <a href=" the Rezonans-NE</a> long range radar system which provided situational awareness over much wider areas than any other radar system in the country. Deputy CEO of the Rezonans research centre, Alexander Stuchilin, disclosed in August that year: "At the beginning of 2020 this radar identified U.S. F-35 planes and tracked them… The radar’s personnel were transmitting information, including the routes of F-35 flights, in clear, thus confirming that it was reliably tracking the planes. For this reason, the opponent did not commit any irreparable actions that might have caused a big war.” The radar system is not well suited to targeting, and by no means provides Iran with a means of shooting down enemy stealth fighters, but it does provide significant awareness of the positions of enemy assets including stealth aircraft well beyond the country’s airspace. Iran was also reported in 2020 to have <a href=" new missiles </a>for its Russian S-300 systems, which were speculated to be 48N6DM missiles facilitating a 250 kilometre targeting range.  </p><p ><img src=" title="Rezonans-NE Radar System"></p><p >While Iran’s reliance on ground based air defence systems is very significant, due primarily to its lack of modern fighter aircraft, the role played by Russian systems remains relatively limited. Russia’s withdrawal from the S-300 deal in 2010, and withdrawal from multiple prior agreements in the 1990s, led Iran to develop its own air defence systems which have been utilised in combat. A notable incident occured in May 2019, when an Iranian-developed 3rd of Khoradad system <a href=" target="_blank">shot down </a>a Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk drone in or near the country’s airspace. The bulk of long range systems fielded include increasingly <a href=" target="_blank">advanced variants of the Bavar-373</a> and Khordad 15, as well as significant stockpiles of S-200s which have <a href=" target="_blank">continued to be modernised </a>in the country. </p><p >S-300s are fielded in relatively small numbers, and with the PMU-2 variant dating back to the 1990s it is reportedly significantly less capable than the latest indigenous systems now in service. The Rezonans-NE is currently likely the most significant Russian air defence asset in Iranian service, with reports of a breakdown of <a href=" target="_blank">plans to acquire</a> Russian Su-35 fighters ensuring that Russian equipment is not relied on heavily. While the potency of indigenous air defence systems is uncertain, a key weakness of Iran’s air defence network remains its lack of powerful elevated sensors, with no airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft in service and none of its fighters deploying any remotely modern radar systems, which means its reliance on ground based radars remains extreme. </p>