Why North Korean Pilots Are Deploying to Russia: A Turning Point For Pyongyang’s Air Force

<p >South Korean government sources have reported that North Korean combat aviation pilots were dispatched to Vladivostok in the Russian Far East in September, preceding the first reported deployments of the country’s <a href=" target="_blank">regular ground units</a> and <a href=" target="_blank">special forces </a>in early October. The reported deployment has fuelled widespread speculation regarding its purpose. The Russian Air Force has for years suffered from significant pilot shortages, with the high tempo of <a href=" target="_blank">operations</a> in the Ukrainian theatre, the expansion of pilot requirements as fighter production <a href=" target="_blank">has been expanded</a>, and the growing pressure on air defences from <a href=" target="_blank">expanding NATO forces </a>across Russian borders, all further increasing this strain. North Korean pilots could help alleviate this, with pilots from elite units operating the country’s <a href=" target="_blank">MiG-23ML</a> and <a href=" target="_blank">MiG-29 fighters </a>and <a href=" target="_blank">Su-25 attack jets</a> estimated to have similar training levels to their counterparts in the Russian Air Force. Flying Russian fighter aircraft and attack jets would allow North Korean pilots to gain experience paid for by Russia, while exposing them to relatively little risk and simultaneously helping to bolster a strategic partner against Pyongyang’s Western Bloc adversaries.</p><p ><img src=" title="North Korean Pilots and Su-25s"></p><p >Although even North Korea’s newest fighter aircraft are significantly older than the average fighters in the Russian fleet, major efforts have been made to domestically modernise avionics including installation of glass cockpits and integration of a range of precision guided weapons. This could help to significantly reduce required re-training to fly Russian fighters, although the MiG-29 and Su-25 do still play limited roles in the Russian fleet today. There also remains a significant possibility that acquainting North Korean personnel with new classes of Russian aircraft and air launched guided weapons could pave the way for either of these to be exported to the East Asian state. The possible loopholes which Moscow could seek to exploit in the current UN arms embargo on Pyongyang to facilitate fighter exports were <a href=" in detail </a>by a leading expert on North Korean security in January, at a time when Korean ballistic missile sales to Russia were first confirmed. </p><p ><img src=" title="North Korean Officials Inspect Su-57 Cockpit"></p><p >Author of the<a href=" target="_blank"> recent book</a> on North Korean security Surviving the Unipolar Era: North Korea’s 35 Year Standoff with the United States A. B. Abrams <a href=" that Moscow had two primary means of providing fighters to North Korea. The first would be “to export fighters from classes the country already fields such as the MiG-29,” which it could be claimed were delivered before the embargo to “retain a degree of plausible deniability.” Regarding the second more controversial option, he elaborated: </p><p >“should North Korea acquire Russian combat aircraft other than MiG-29s, such as the more advanced Su-35 and Su-57 fighters recently <a href=" its leader Kim Jong Un on a visit to Russia in September, these could be accompanied by Russian personnel at North Korean bases and presented as operating under a joint Russian-led unit – whatever the reality of the command structures under which they actually function. Such long range fighters, which are very easily capable of flying across Korea from airfields across the Russian border, could even be deployed between bases in the two countries to further this perception – while retaining duties such as <a href=" American bombers near the peninsula and <a href=" military parades in Pyongyang.”</p><p ><img src=" title="Russian Su-35 (back) and Su-57 Fighters"></p><p >Training North Korean pilots in Russia would be a requirement to allow the country to acquire new classes of fighter such as the<a href=" target="_blank"> Su-35</a> or <a href=" target="_blank">Su-57</a>, with the training regime potentially occurring in parallel with low risk combat sorties in the Ukrainian theatre. North Korean officials have reportedly shown an <a href=" target="_blank">interest</a> in such acquisitions in the past. For Russia, such an arrangement would be highly favourable for multiple reasons. A more modern North Korean air force would reduce pressure on Russian defences in the country’s far east in the event of a joint war effort with the Western Bloc in the region, and create greater opportunities for joint operations in the Pacific. A pool of North Korean pilots trained on modern Russian combat jets would also provide the East Asian state with more capacity to lend pilots to the Russian Air Force to help alleviate strain on the fleet. Furthermore, with Russia having increasingly struggled to export fighter aircraft as <a href=" target="_blank">rival Chinese aircraft </a>offer <a href=" target="_blank">higher levels of sophistication</a>, North Korea remains a captive market with a very large air force which could sustain export orders that would support Russian industry. </p>